Patent Pools in the Light of Antitrust Regulations: A Comparative Analysis of India and the European Union

Abstract

The recent COVID-19 pandemic has underscored the tension between incentivizing pharmaceutical innovation through intellectual property (IP) rights and ensuring broad access to life-saving technologies. This paper examines patent pools as collaborative arrangements that enable multiple patent holders to license their patents collectively and how such arrangements have been addressed under antitrust regulations in India and the European Union (EU). Adopting a comparative approach, it highlights how the pandemic prompted a re-evaluation of patent pooling as a mechanism to balance innovation incentives with public health needs. We have analysed patent pools’ core benefits in mitigating patent thickets and fostering innovation, alongside their potential anti-competitive risks. We then compare regulatory approaches in the EU and India, noting how competition law in each jurisdiction affects the formation and operation of patent pools. The impact of COVID-19 on these regimes is emphasized, particularly how emergency circumstances led to adaptations in antitrust enforcement to facilitate collaboration. Real-world examples, including the WHO’s COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) and vaccine partnerships like Oxford–AstraZeneca and Pfizer–BioNTech, illustrate the practical challenges and outcomes of patent pooling during the pandemic. The discussion explores how aligning antitrust policies with IP rights can either hinder or promote innovation. The paper concludes with recommendations for policy reforms to encourage pro-competitive patent pooling and ensure that innovation and access advance in tandem.